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RECENT CASES
Crimmal Law-Statutory Interpretation-Imminently Dangerous. D was charged
with first-degree murder for intentionally shooting deceased. Defense was insanity in
that D did not know what he was doing. The trial court instructed the jury that D
would be guilty if the killing was by an act imnune4tly dangerous to deceased and
evincing a depraved mind, heedless of human life, even with no premeditated design
to effect death. This instruction was challenged on appeal. Held: Conviction reversed.
Where the act causing a person's death is specifically aimed at and inflicted upon
deceased alone, the perpetrator of the act cannot be convicted under subdivision 2 of
the murder statute. State v. Mitchell, 129 Wash. Dec. 437, 188 P. (2d) 88 (1947).
REt. REv. STAT. § 2392 [P P C. § 117-5] provides that
The killing of a human being; unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the
first degree when committed either1. With a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed, or,
2. By an act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, without a premeditated design to effect the death of any individual, or,
3. Without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of, or
in an attempt to commit, or in withdrawing from the scene of, a robbery, rape,
burglary, larceny or arson in the first degree.
The Mitchell case represents the first time in which subdivision 2 has been passed
on by the Washington court. In limiting its applicability to cases in which more than
one person is endangered by the defendant's act, the court followed Darry v. People,
10 N. Y. 120 (1854), in which it was reasoned that a contrary rule would allow
conviction for first-degree murder in any homicide where, in the "loose and uncertain
opinion of the jury," the act evinces a depraved mind regardless of human life. When
considered in the light of subdivision 2 alone, the Mitchell limitation seems to be a
salutary one.
However, it may be that the holding reveals a loophole in the murder statute.
If A were to beat B intentionally "to within an inch of his life" resulting in B's death,
A could not be convicted of first-degree murder under the Washington statute though
he would clearly be liable to the death penalty under the common law which only
required intent to inflict great bodily harm or knowledge that the act would probably
result in great injury. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAw, art. 264(b) (8th ed.
1947). A could not be convicted under subdivision 1 because there was no premeditated design to effect B's death, the homicide would not be a felony murder because
subdivision 3 does not provide for assault or battery; and, under the Mitchell holding,
A would not be guilty because his imminently dangerous act was directed only at
deceased. Further, if A should kill C while escaping and there is no premeditated
design in commission of the second homicide, then A would still be guilty of only
second-degree murder since subdivision 3 does not list murder, either in the first or
second degree. Again, if a newly born child is laid naked out of doors, it is murder
at common law even though the guilty party would have been very glad to have a
stranger find the child and save it. HOLMES, THE CoMMoN LAw 53 (1945). Under
the Washington statute, however, the guilty party could not be convicted of first-degree
murder. There was no premeditated design to effect death since the defendant hoped
the child would be saved, there is no commission of any of the felonies enumerated in
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subdivision 3, and, the dangerous act was directed at only one person thereby making

subdivision 2 inapplicable by the Mitchell limitation.

The decision also presents the question of what the result will be where defendant
knows his imminently dangerous act will imperil at least one person (shooting into
the dark knowing at least one person is there). Arguably, the language of the Mitchell
case, though not explicit on this point, indicates subdivision 2 would not apply since it
refers only to cases where more than one person is endangered. This interpretation,
placing the emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the act rather than on the
defendant's state of mind, would lead to the anomalous result that a person would
escape the first-degree murder penalty by the mere chance that his victim was alone

at the time.

The Mitchell case presented the court with the dilemma of either allowing the
statute to say too much or requiring it to say too little. Limiting the statute as was
done precludes convictions of first-degree murder where they should be available.
Lack of such limitation would permit subdivisions I and 3 to be by-passed by a toogeneral application of subdivision 2.
It is submitted that this dilemma may be resolved by a legislative reworking of
the statute. Subdivision 1 could be reworded so as to allow convictions where hormcide, unjustifiable and inexcusable, is committed with intent to do grievous bodily
injury to deceased. It has been suggested that "malice aforethought" or "premeditated
design" be replaced by merely requiring that the homicide be committed by defendant

with a "man-endangering-state-of-mind." Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537 (1934). Further, the felony murder section should be
revised to include murder, both first and second degree, among those felonies necessary
for conviction under subdivision 3.
J.D.B.

Unfair Trade Practices---'Loss Leaders"-The Washington Fair Trade Act. D, a
gasoline station operator, advertised two gallons of gasoline free (except for tax) with
every seven gallons purchased. In a prosecution for violation of the UNFAM SALES ACT,
Wis. STAT. § 100.30, held. the sale must be treated as a sale of nine gallons of gasoline,
and if not below cost in the aggregate, there has been no "loss leader" and no violation
of the statute. State v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 26 N. W. (2nd) 647 (1947).
Despite the fact that the legislative declaration of policy included certain "deceptive
practices" within its stigma, the enacting clauses make it sufficiently clear that deceptiveness is not the gist of the offense, but rather the injury resulting to competitors and
manufacturers of trademark articles through sales below cost. Since the pretended detriment to the vendor of the "gift" offer (whereas in reality a sale in quantity with an
over-all profit resulted) could not be regarded as having induced the sale, the "deception" referred to would not appear tortious in character.
Since the Wisconsin Act stipulates, in subsection 2(j), that each item must be regarded as offered for sale in determining at what price it was sold, the court seems
justified in the distinction it draws between offers of a premium in specie and offers of
different goods as inducement to the sale. Thus D, above, could not have offered a
quart of oil free or below cost in conjunction with a sale of gasoline. The decision
has clarified the definition of "loss leader" and has limited it to sales and offers of any
individual article below cost (including "gifts") to promote the sale of another article
or to divert trade from competitors.
The Washington Unfair Practices Act, REM. REv. STAT. § 5854-21 to 36 [P P C.
§ 989-1 to 31], does not restrict the element of deceptiveness to its statement of legisla-
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tive purpose but has embodied it in the definition of "loss leader" in subsection (21) as
a "misleading practice." None of the enacting clauses, however would appear to support
a contention that the act seeks to protect against anything other than unfair competition
and derogation of trademark goods.
The Washington Act seems overly definitive in attempting to outline the practices it
seeks to prohibit, and difficulties of judicial construction may be expected. To the
factual situation presented by the principal case, no less than three overlapping portions
might be deemed applicable: (1) "Loss leader" as defined in subsection (21) is the
sale of "any article
at less than cost
to induce
the purchase of other merchandise
" (Italics ours) Under the reasoning of the Wisconsin Court, this would
not apply to homogenous "free" offers and sales. (2) Subsection (24) besides prohibiting "loss leaders" makes it unlawful to "give away any article
for the purpose of
injuring competitors or destroying competition
" This would seem to be an express prohibition of any "free" offer, but at the expense of losing the attractive advertising advantage, the same pecuniary result could be achieved by a reduction of the
unit price. (3) The same subsection makes it unlawful "to sell any article
at less
than the cost thereof to such vendor
" Query: If this latter be deemed not applicable to the tit specie sale and gift, what is the status of the "one-cent sale" where, to all
appearances, the prermum is "sold" below cost? It would seem difficult under the statute
to regard the transaction as a whole in determinng at what price the it specie premium
was sold.
It is suggested that if the legislative intent was to prohibit the in specie gift offer,
the "one-cent sale," and other similar retail advertising ,and selling practices, it is
inconsistent with existing ethical standards of competitive merchandising. If, on the
other hand, it is directed toward the maintenance of trademark'article prices at an
"above cost" level.to protect the rights of the manufacturer and retail competitors (as
is manifestly proper), it has done so in a laborious and. overly comprehensive manner.
C. L. S.

Ejectment-Demand for Rent-Forfeirure. P leased certain realty to D for five years,
rent payable monthly, with a forfeiture provision for nonpayment. D failed to pay on
the stipulated day. P demanded payment the next succeeding day and, when refused,
elected to declare a forfeiture. Written notice of this was served on D, no alternate
notice to pay or remove being given as prescribed by the unlawful detaner statute,
REu. REv. STAT. § 812 EP P C. § 55-5]. Instead P commenced his action under REm.
'REv. STAT. § 785 [P P C. § 24-1], the quiet title and ejectment statute, claiming that
under this section no alternate notice need be given, and further that the common law rule requiring a demand for rent on the date due had been changed by
RE. REv. STAT. § 785, supra. Trial court sustained D's demurrer on the ground that
no alternate notice was given. Held: Reversed. No alternate notice need be given by
one proceeding under REi. REv. STAT. § 785. The common law rule regarding notice
of forfeiture, although not changed by § 785, has been modified by § 548, CODE of 1881,
thus bringing this suit was sufficient demand to sustain the cause of action. Petch v.
Willmnan, 129 Wash. Dec. 130, 185 P.(2d) 992 (1947).
Unlawful detainer is a purely statutory and summary procedure, requiring that a
landlord need give only three days notice to a delinquent tenant, and giving the landlord immediate possession subject to.certain conditions if the tenant fails to pay within that time. Ejectment is the common law method of removing a tenant and except
as modified by statute works a complete forfeiture. In the instant case, to sustain P',
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action the court found that the common law rule in regard to forfeiture, s. e., demand
on date due before forfeiture can be declared, has been modified in at least two instances. To support this, two apparently forgotten statutes were unearthed and declared to have been neither superseded nor repealed. The statutes, §§ 2056 and 548,
CODE of 1881, have both been considered by compilers as repealed and have been omitted from the codes since 1891.
Section 2056, providing that a landlord may give a delinquent tenant ten days to pay
or remove, at the expiration of which time the tenancy shall be forfeited if the tenant
has failed to pay, was inapplicable here because P gave no such notice. However,
§ 548 was found applicable. It provides in substance that where a tenant has failed to
pay rent and the landlord has a subsisting right to re-enter, he may bring an action
to recover the property, "and such action is equivalent to demand of rent and re-entry
on the property." It also provides for redemption of the lease by the lessee if he pays
what is due plus costs, etc. In finding that this statute was still law, the court pointed
out that § 548, CODE of 1881 was in a chapter entitled, "Actions to Recover and Affecting Real Estate." It apparently was the belief of the compiler of the 1891 Code that
§ 22 of "An Act relating to summary proceedings for obtaining possession of real property in certain cases, and declaring an emergency," approved in 1890, or its successor,
WASH. LAWS 1891, C. 96, § 21, entitled "An act defining forcible entry, forcible detamer and unlawful detainer of real property, and providing remedies therefor by summary proceedings," had superseded § 548, or else that the repealer clause, WASH. LAWS
1891, C. 96, § 25, had repealed it. In this the compiler was probably in error. Section 548 deals with the situation where (a) tenant has failed to pay rent and (b)
landlord has a subsisting right to re-enter. Then, under § 548, the landlord can
bring an action to recover his property, such action to be equivalent to a demand
for rent. At this time the tenant has the right of redemption. It is evident that this
suit by the landlord is not an action in unlawful detainer, since there is no provision
for shortened notice or summary procedure. Moreover WASH. LAWS 1891, C. 96, § 21,
above mentioned, now REm. REv. STAT. § 830 (P P C. § 55-41] which was believed
to have superseded § 548, although giving somewhat similar relief to a tenant, gives
it only in cases where the tenancy has been forfeited under unlawful detainer. State
ex rel. Waterman v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 37, 220 Pac. 5 (1923). It is thus plain
that § 548 was for an entirely different purpose, t. e., to give relief to tenants who could
not claim under REm. REv. STAT. § 830, mipra. The repealer clause afore-mentioned
could have no effect on § 548 because it referred only to code provisions of the subject
matter of that act, namely, forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Logically, code provisions referring to ejectment and quiet title could not be repealed, because they pertained to different subject matter. Unless there is some further statute on the subject,
which careful search has failed to reveal, the court is undoubtedly correct in its analysis. It is interesting to note that the whereabouts of these two long omitted statutes
has apparently not been questioned in over half a century. Further, neither counsel in
the principal case even considered it, the exhumation being left to the initiative of the
state Supreme Court.
M.D. A.
Carriers-Instructions-Degree of Care-Passengers Under Disabilities. P,an ambulatory cripple, was injured while a passenger on D's trolley. P was thrown to the
floor by a sudden start of the bus before he was seated. The operator had carried
P on previous occasions and had noticed P getting on the bus by grasping the rail
and dragging himself up one step at a time. In an action for personal injuries the trial
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court gave the normal instruction as to degree of care and also instructed that P
was entitled to recover even in the absence of a sudden start if the operator knew
or in the exercise of the highest degree of care could have known that P's injury
was such that he should have been allowed to be seated before the bus started. judgment for P Appeal. Held: Reversed. The latter instruction might cause the jury to
feel that the operator should have exercised a medical diagnostician's skill. The
jury should have been told that the operator need exrcise only ordinary care in
ascertaining the infirmities of his passengers. Gray v. Seattle, 129 Wash. Dec. 399, 187
P.(2d) 310 (1947).
It has long been the law in Washington that a common carrier is bound to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers consistent with the
practical operation of its vehicle. Denhanz v. Wash. Water Power Co., 38 Wash. 354,
80 Pac. 546 (1905), Anderson v. Harrison, 4 Wn.(2d) 265, 130 P.(2d) 320 (1940).
Although similar factual situations have arisen, the specific problem presented by
this case has not been discussed before. Ordinarily it is not negligence to start a
trolley before the passenger is seated, but when the passenger is aged, infirm, or
crippled, the operator may be under a duty to wait until he is seated. Plattorv. Seattle
Electric Co., 44 Wash. 408, 87 Pac. 489 (1906), Rice v. Puget Sound L. & P Co.,
80 Wash. 47, 141 Pac. 191, 53 L. R. A. (ns) 797 (1914).
Most modem courts and text writers deplore the use of degrees of care and negligence because the potential confusion of such. an approach outweighs its utility.
Salmond, LAW or TORTS (8th ed. 1934), 462 note; PRossER oN TORTs (1941) 258.
They suggest as a unversal standard the conduct of a reasonably prudent man under
the circumstances of each case. See Thayer, Liability Without Fault in SELEcTED
EssAYs ON THE LAW OF ToRTs, 603, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934), 283. In the
instant case the substance of the court's holding is: (1) the requirement of the highest
degree of care applies only to the operation of the vehicle, and (2) the observation of
the condition of the passengers, not being a part of that operation, will require only
ordinary care. This holding appears open to objection. Because of the public nature
of such an undertaking, the establisheil policy of the law has been to require the
carrier to provide the utmost safety for its passengers, and presumably this applies to
the disabled as well as the physically. sound. It then seems inconsistent to say that the
carrier is discharging its high duty to all passengers if it exercises only ordinary care
in determining the measures necessary to effect this safety-which precaution would
not call for the specialized skill of a medical observer. Logically the present case will
require the court to define the scope of the term "operation of the vehicle." The tenor
of the holding suggests that this scope will be narrowly confined. Seemingly the
application of the reasonable man standard of the text writers would obviate the
present problem, but even a strict adherence to the established requrement of highest
practical care in all situations would furnish a more sound and workable solution.
Regardless of the view taken, since it adequately appears here that the operator
had actual knowledge that P was crippled, the instruction of the trial court on this
point would seem to be mere surplusage not amounting to reversible error.
D. W L.
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Effect on Washington Law. A was
convicted of murder in the first degree in Californka. The conviction was affirmed.
People v. Adanson, 27 Cal.(2d) 478, 165 P.(2d) 3 (1946). Both the California constitution, Art. I, § 3, and Penal Code, § 1323, permit court and counsel to comment
on the accused's failure to testify. In appealing to the Supreme Court of the United
States, A charged that he was in effect forced to testify. This, he urged, is self-incrimi
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nation, which is either a national privilege, or immunity contained in the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and protected from the state abridgment by the Fourteenth
Amendment, or was contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held, in a five to four decision. neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment effective
against the states. The dissent contended that the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Adamson v. California,
67 S. Ct. 1672 (1947).
Four years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by the states, the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36 (U. S. 1872), held that it did not secure federal
protection for state privileges and immunities. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900),
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908). Only "fundamental" principles of liberty
and justice are now protected by due process from state abridgment. These have been
held to be fundamental freedom of religion, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296
(1940) , freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and petition, De Jong v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353 (1937), just compensation for property taken for public use, Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 266 (1897) , right to counsel in certain cases, Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932). Several other provisions of the federal Bill of Rights
have been decreed not to be fundamental rights and, therefore, not limitations on state
action. These include right to bear arms, Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886),
right of indictment by grand jury, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884) , privilege against self-incrimination, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 76 (1908) , right to
jury trial in criminal cases, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900), in civil cases,
Walker v. Sauvnet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875).
What effect would the dissenting view have on Washington law? The Washington
constitution contains provisions approximating practically all of those contained in the
first eight amendments of the federal Constitution. These provisions, although similar
in wording, have not always been interpreted to be the same. The interpretation placed
upon double jeopardy in Kepner v. U S., 195 U. S. 100 (1904), would lead one to
believe that the Fifth Amendment would prohibit appeals being allowed the federal
government after the defendant has been put in jeopardy. By statute, RE-it. REv. STAT.
§ 2183-1 [P P C. § 5-3], in Washington the state has the right of appeal in at least
two situations after verdict has been given for the accused. Yet the double jeopardy
clause as contained in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution is very similiar
in wording to Art. I, § 9, of the Washington constitution. In at least two cases the
Washington constitution itself is at variance with the federal Constitution. (1) The
right of grand jury is guaranteed in the federal Constitution, Fifth Amendment, but
not in the state constitution, Art. I, § 25, (2) Jury trial in the federal Constitution, as
interpreted in the Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1 (1899), consists of a jury
of twelve men, but by Art I, § 21 of the Washington constitution a jurv of less than
twelve men may be used in courts not of record, and a verdict of less than twelve men
may be given in civil cases.
The result of the minority view would be to bind the state to the interpretation
placed on the rights and privileges contained in the first eight amendments of the
federal Constitution, a deep inroad on the autonomy of the state. Those provisions in
our State constitution and those statutes which are directly at variance with the Bill
of Rights of the federal Constitution as it is now interpreted would probably be held
unconstitutional. Many other state laws would be cast into doubtful position. An indictment by grand jury would be required. With it, probably, would come a deluge of
petitions for writs of habeas corpus from criminals serving time in our state penal in-
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stitutions. The interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on the privileges and immunities would be the rmmum standard. Our state courts would have independence
only in broadening this interpretation. Any change in reducing the scope of the privilege and immunities would have to come by amendment to the Constitution of the
United States or by a change in the interpretation placed upon them by the Supreme
Court. Even if the view of the minority is theoretically correct, could such a drastic
change be justified?
S. R. B.
Divorce-Custody of Children-Enforcement Pending Appeal. An interlocutory
decree of divorce granted H directed that he should deliver his minor child to W
Pending H's appeal from custody award,, W brought an original proceeding in the
Supreme Court for an order to show cause why H should not be ordered to deliver
the child or to be held in contempt and have his appeal dismissed. Held. An order
awarding custody of children cannot be superseded on appeal, but since remedies are
available to W in the trial court the Supreme Court is not the proper forum and the
petition must be dismissed. Sewell v. Sewell, 128 Wash. Dec. 272, 184 P.(2d) 761
(1947).
A method for the suspension of remedies pending appeal provided by Rnm. Rav.
STAT. § 1722 [P P C. § 5-17] is a stay of proceedings whein a sufficient supersedeas
bond is filed. However, an interlocutory decree with respect to the custody of minor
children cannot be superseded, State ex rel. Davenport v. Poindexter, 45 Wash. 37,
87 Pac. 1069 (1906), upon the theory that the welfare of children, always paramount,
cannot be protected by a bond. Heretofore the Washington court has nevertheless
given an appeal the effect of a stay of proceedings by refusing to enforce, or to allow
the trial court to enforce, the custody order in the absence of a showing that the
welfare of the child requires immediate compliance. State ex rel. Clark v. Superwr
Court, 90 Wash. 80, 155 Pac. 398 (1916), State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Supertor Court,
108 Wash. 15, 183 Pac. 63 (1919). Without discussion of the welfare of the child, the
court in the instant case departs from this rule.
The departure may have serious consequences in view of the further holding that
the trial court is the proper forum in which to secure enforcement of the order, and
leaving unchanged the rule that that court is impotent to change or modify the order
II aiy way pending appeal, Rung v. Irving, 26 Wash. 122, 66 Pac. 123 (1901),
Pike v. Pike, 24 Wn.(2d) 735, 167 P.(2d) 401, 163 A. L. R. 1314, (1946). See also
Ram. Rav. STAT. § 996 [P P C. § 23-41]. Since the trial court must enforce the
order which it cannot change, the right of review might be impaired in some situations, e.g., when the decree allows the party awarded custody to take the children out
of the state and the jurisdiction of the coqrt.
In dismissing the petition, the court stated that it will order production of the
child and dismiss appeals in divorce actions where it appears that the appellant has
surreptitiously taken the children out of the jurisdiction or will not otherwise abide
the appeal. It would seem that this is inconsistent with the holding that the proper
forum for enforcement is the trial court. Although the show cause order was issued
for the express purpose of enabling the court to indicate the proper procedure to be
followed in this situation, it is submitted that the decision does not accomplish the
desired clarification. The position of the three dissenting justices, that once an appeal
is taken the entire jtifsdiction concerning the case vests in the Supreme Court, would
appear to be the more sound.
Quacre: If the welfare of the child becomes jeopardized pending appeal, will the
instant decision be followed?
D.E.R.
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Taxpayer's Action to Restrain Illegal Acts of State Officers or Committees. In a suit
by a taxpayer to restrain the state capitol committee from consummating a sale of
state capitol timber, the court deemed it necessary to determine "when, if ever, can a
taxpayer who has no direct, special, or pecuniary interest in a transaction complained
of, restrain or set aside the action of state officers or committees such as the state
capitol committee if they are acting in excess of their authority or in violation of
law, or if the acts complained of constitute malfeasance in office?" Held. In absence
of statute a demand on the proper public officer to take appropriate action is a condition precedent to maintenance of taxpayer's action challenging the validity of what
public officers intend to do or have done, unless facts showing that such demand would
have been useless are alleged. Since T had not alleged a demand on the attorney
general, a demurrer to the complaint was sustained.. Reiter v. Wallgren, 128 Wash.
Dec. 693, 184 P.(2d) 571 (1947).
As a general rule, when the taxpayer has a sufficient interest to maintain the suit,
a demand upon the proper public officer to bring suit in the name of the taxpayer is
a condition precedent to the taxpayer's action. Milwaukee Horse & Cow Commisso,
Co. v. Hill, 207 Wis. 420, 241 N. W 364 (1932), Jones v. Centralia, 157 Wash. 194,
289 Pac. 3 (municipal funds) (1930). The taxpayer, suing in his private capacity,
has no standing to maintain a suit to enjoin a state officer from committing a breach
of public duty, without showing that he will suffer a special injury differing in land
from that suffered by the general public. Lawson v. Baker (Tex. Civ. App.), 220 S. W
260 (1920), Goodland v. Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 10 N. W. (2d) 180 (1943), Crews
v. Beattie, 197 S. C. 32, 14 S. E.(2d) 351 (1941). However, in cases involving a
misapplication of funds or property, the majority rule is that the taxpayer has a
sufficient interest to maintain the action. Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N. E.
102 (1920), Johnson v. Gibson, 240 Mich. 515, 215 N. W 333 (1927), Peck v. Tugwell, 199 La. 125, 5 So.(2d) 145 (1941), Clark v. Crown Drug Co., 348 Mo. 91, 152
S. W.(2d) 145 (1941). The Washington court holds with the minority that it is
safer to relegate suits involving the disposition of the revenue of the state, where no
special interests are involved, to the judgment and discretion of the attorney general.
Jones v. Reed, 3 Wash. 57, 27 Pac. 1067 (1891). It has been held that the attorney
general has the sole right to maintain an action in the interests of the public to coerce
or restrain a particular course of action by a state officer or board unless the taxpayer
shows a direct pecuniary injury. State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519,
293 Pac. 1000 (1930). The minority, however, hold that the taxpayer has a sufficient
interest to restrain unlawful expenditures or waste of municipal or county funds
through his increased tax burden. Jones v. Centralia,supra, Sasse v. King County, 196
Wash. 242, 82 P.(2d) 536 (1938).
The principal case implies that the taxpayer could have maintained the action if a
demand on the attorney general had been alleged. If this is true, it is clear that the
court has established a new rule of law governing taxpayers' actions in those cases
not involving a misapplication of funds or property. This view is strengthened since
the court could have held that the Jones v. Reed doctrine, supra, applied. If the interest
required for the taxpayer to maintain an action is his increased tax burden, it seems
clear that a case involving a misapplication of funds or property involves a greater
need for protection than one which only involves malfeasance or acts in violation of
law. Therefore, it is believed that a direct overruling of Jones v. Reed, supra, would
be more desirable than the result of the instant case.
E. M. N.
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Unemployment Compensation-Parties Within Purview of Act-Determination of
Status "In Employment." Upon being held liable for contributions to the unemployment compensation fund by the commissioner of unemployment compensation, the
owners of certain purse seine fishing vessels appealed to the superior court where the
decision was affirmed. The vessels were operating under the customary "share" or
"lay" plan. The sole issue to be decided on appeal was whether the crew members
were persons "in the employment" of the owners within the purview of RE. REV.
STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 9998-140 et seq. Held: Affirmed. In finding "employment" the
court established. (1) that the crew members weriiperforming "personal service,
of whatever nature, unlimited by the relationship of master and servant as known to
the common law
for wages or under any contract calling for the performance of
personal services
," REm.REv. STAT. (1945 Supp.) § 9998-150 [P P C. § 923t-77],
and (2) that the exception tests as provided in REm. REV. STAT. (1945 Supp.)
§ 9998-154 [P P C. § 923t-85) were not met. Skrvanch et al. v. Davis, 129 Wash.
Dec. 143, 186 P.(2d) 364 (1947).
Since the passage of the Unemployment Compensation Act of 1937 the court has
vacillated between strict and liberal interpretations of "employment." The early cases
were in doubt as to whether the meaning of "employment" under the Act was limited
to concepts attending the common law relationship of master and servant. McDermott
v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938), held that it was not so limited, but
see to the contrary Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d)
718 (1939). Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wn. (2d) 264, 114 P. (2d) 995 (1941), then swung
back to the more liberal rule as laid down in the McDernott case, which view was
followed by In re Foy, 10 Wn. (2d) 317, 116 P. (2d) 545 (1941), "If the common law
relationship of master and servant was to obtain, the legislature would have so stated."
Sound Cities Gas & Oil v. Ryan, 13 Wn. (2d) 457, 465, 125 P. (2d) 246, 249 (1942),
Unemployment Comp. Dept. v. Hunt, 17 Wn. (2d) 228, 135 P. (2d) 89 (1943).
The more recent cases seem to show that the common law test is no longer valid.
The Washington legislature appears to have settled the question by adding to the
definition of employment, "unlimited by the relationship of master and servant as
known to the common law," in the 1942 amendment. However, the case of Broderck,
Inc. v. Riley, 22 Wn.(2d) 760, 157 P.(2d) 954 (1945), again applied, at least temporarily, a narrow construction to the act. Real estate brokers working for commission
were declared without the statute. The court held that no relationship of employment
existed within the meaning of the act since the remuneration for the brokers' services
was not paid out of funds belonging to the realty company. See also In re Coppage,
22 Wn.(2d) 802, 157 P.(2d) 977 (1945).
The instant case found that fishermen working under the "share" plan were performing services for the employer and wages were paid from the employer's funds
but noted parenthetically that the statute does not requre wages or remuneration to be
paid out of funds belonging to the employer. Rather the statute was held to embrace
any relationship wherein an individual has in his employ a person engaged in performing personal services.
The court attempts to distinguish the Broderck case by contending that it arose
under the 1943 amendment to the Unemployment Compensation Act which suggested
a narrower construction of "employment" than does the 1945 amendment. The 1943
statute defined employment:
Employment, subject to the other provisions in this subsection means service
performed for wages or under any contract of lure, written or oral, express or implied.
Ram. REV. STAT. (1943 Supp.) § 9998-119g(1) [P P C. § 928-37g(1)].
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The words "contract of hire" have been changed to "contract calling for the performance of personal services" in the 1945 statute, but this difference seems negligible.
Rather it appears that the Skrivantch case represents a swing once more from a
narrow to a broad construction of the act. However, it is arguable that the court is
not actually varying its interpretation but is rather seeking to apply the statute in
a manner most consistent with legislative policy. Fishermen would seem much more
clearly than real estate brokers to be within the class of persons the act was designed
to benefit, i.e., those whose livelihood depends upon the willingness of other persons
to create jobs by putting capital at risk.
W A.R.

New Trials-Statutory Grounds-Effect on the Inherent Power of Trial Court.
D was convicted of second-degree murder. The trial court, after saying, "The court
being further of opinion that on the facts the case was very close, and a jury composed of conscientious and reasonable people might well conclude that the homicide
was justified," granted a new trial on the grounds that "the verdict is contary to the
law and evidence." Held: Order for new trial reversed. The amendment of 1933,
REM. REv. STAT. § 399 [P P C. § 78-3], specifying as a ground for new trial "that
there is no evidence or reasonable snference from the evidence to justify the verdict
or the decision, or that it is contrary to law," (italics ours) is the only basis for
granting new trials on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. State v. Brent,
128 Wash. Dec. 371, 183 P.(2d) 495 (1947).
The grounds for granting a new trial in croinal actions are contained in REM.
REv. STAT. § 2181 [P P C. § 136-1], the sixth being identical to ground 2 contained
in the trial court's order. The court, therefore, erred in applying REM. REV. STAT.
§ 399 [P P C. § 78-31, which contains the grounds for a new trial in civil actions.
Hence the interpretation of the 1933 amendment which limits the trial court's discretion in granting new trials on the basis of insufficiency of evidence appears
inapplicable.
The court recognizes that numerous decisions hold that the statutory language
gives the trial court a very broad discretion in the matter of granting new trials for
insufficiency of the evidence but dismisses them as being abrogated by the 1933 amendment. However, in so deciding, the court apparently failed to recognize that it is
overruling settled law in Washington. In the leading case on the exact ground in
question, the court held that subdivision 7 of sec. 1, Chapter 138, Laws of 1933, p. 482,
did not take away from the court the right to exercise its discretion with reference to
the granting of a new trial when the court should believe that substantial justice had
not been done in the case. Braininer v. Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P.(2d) 947
(1934). Cited with approval in Lowther v. Tollefson, 184 Wash. 55, 49 P.(2d) 908
(1935), Starr v. Baird, 25 Wn.(2d) 381, 170 P.(2d) 655 (1946), Wood v. Hallenbarter, 12 Wn.(2d) 576, 122 P.(2d) 798 (1942), Bond v. Ovens, 20 Wn.(2d) 354,
147 P.(2d) 514 (1944). In Huntington v. Clallavn Grain Co., 175 Wash. 310, 27
P (2d) 583 (1933), it was held that the granting of a new trial because the verdict is
against the weight of evidence is discretionary with the trial court, which ruling will
not be disturbed unless the discretion is manifestly abused. Leer v. Cohen, 10 Wn. (2d)
239, 116 P.(2d) 535 (1941), Dyal v. Fire Companies Etc., Inc., 23 Wn.(2d) 515,
161 P.(2d) 321 (1945). Myers v. Weyerhaeuser, 197 Wash. 407, 85 P.(2d) 1091
(1938) said that whether a verdict should be set aside as against the evidence is a
question which is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, and an appellate
court will not interfere except under "most extraordinary circumstances."

RECENT CASES
The effect of this decision would be to greatly limit the trial court's discretionary
power to grant a new trial. However, in view of the application of the wrong statute
and, in effect, the overruling of the Bramtner case, zupra, and all subsequent decisions
without mentioning them or discussing the prior Washington rule, the authority of
the instant case is weak and might not be followed when the question is properly presented and considered.*
R.L.O.
Corporations-Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Stock. Prior to 1947 a corporation in Washington could not ordinarily purchase or traffic in its own stock unless
it did so in the process of reducing its capital stock and had met the requirements of
REM. REv. STAT. § 3803-40 [P P C. § 443-9], (two-thirds vote of shareholders, etc.).
State ex rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 244 Pac. 261 (1926),
Whittaker v. Weller, 8 Wn.(2d) 18, 111 P.(2d) 218 (1941). This prohibition was an
adherence to the so-called English rule, Trevor v. Whitworth, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 409
(1887), which is regarded as the minority rule in the United States. Barrett v. Lumber
Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N. E. 765 (1931), Keith v. Kiliner, 261 Fed. 733, 9 A. L. R. 1287
(1920). The 1947 legislature amended the UNIFORM BusinEss CORPORATION ACT,
REM. REv. STAT. § 3803-12 [P P C. § 441-21] by the addition of the following clause.
(2) Every corporation organized hereunder shall have the power to purchase, hold,
sell and transfer shares of its own capital stock: Provided, That no such corporation
shall use its funds or property for the purchase of its own shares of capital stock when
such use would cause any impairment of the capital stock of the corporation. (WAsH.
LAws 1947, c. 195, § 1)
A question which immediately arises is the meaning of "impairment of the capital
stock." Must the purchase of such stock only be made when the corporation has a surplus of assets over liabilities including capital stock, or may it make the purchase if
the position of the capital stock outstanding after the purchase is not impaired? The
holdings in other jurisdictions are not uniform. While some jurisdictions hold a corporation can purchase its stock only out of surplus, Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262,
169 N. E. 378 (1929), Iback v. Elevator Supplies Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 90, 177 Atl. 458
(1935), others hold that such purchases may be made even in the absence of surplus
if the position of the creditors is not jeopardized. Scriggms v. Thomas Dalby Co.,
290 Mass. 414, 195 N. E. 749 (1935), Ramnussen v. Roberge, 194 Wis. 362, 216 N. W
481 (1928).
The text of the instant amendment seems to have been lifted word for word from
the Deleware CoRpoRATIxO AcT (Rxv. CODE DEL. 1935, § 2051) with the exception
that in the Washington statute the phase "capital stock" has been substituted for the
word "capital." This substitution seems unimportant in the determination of the problem under consideration. The Deleware court in In Re International Radiator Co.,
10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255 (1914) and later the Circuit Court of Appeals in Ashman
v. Miller, 101 F.(2d) 85, 90 (C. C. A. 6th 1939), held that under the Delaware statute:
Capital does not in this connection mean the assets of the company for of course the
assets are reduced when any of it is used by a corporation to purchase shares of its
capital stock. It means that the funds and property of the company shall not be used
for the purchase of shares of its capital stock when the .value of its assets is less than
the aggregate amount of all the shares of its capitalstock outstanding. (Italics supplied)
The italicized portion is essentially the definition of "capital stock" under the Washington BusINEss CoipoRAT0IoN AcT, REm. STAT. § 3803-1(10) [P P C. § 444-1 (X)].
*EDITOR's NOTE: On rehearing en banc, the court reversed the departmental decision and held substantially in accordance with this analysis, State v. Brent, 130 W.D.
265, 191 P.(2d) 682 (1948).
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In both cases the court held that under the Delaware statute a corporation may use
only its surplus for the purchase of its stock
In view of this interpretation of the almost identical Deleware statute and the conservative position of the Washington court regarding the purchase by a corporation of
its own shares previous to the 1947 amendment, it would seem that when the problem
is presented the court will require that a purchase of a corporation of its own stock be
made only out of surplus. This prediction would seem further fortified by the fact that
to hold otherwise would allow a corporation to deplete the security margin of its
creditors as represented by the capital stock without compliance with Rn~r. R'v. STAT.
§ 3803-40, supra. It is hardly possible that the legislature intended this result.
D. E. R.

